contents of the current issue
Volume 1 / Number 2 / Autumn 2009:
Peter van INWAGEN
INDETERMINACY AND VAGUENESS: LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS
Abstract. All indeterminacy is a product of vagueness, and vagueness takes up only where logic has left off-and, therefore, indeterminacy takes up only where logic has left off. Vagueness arises when we draw boundaries and arises because it is humanly impossible to draw any boundary such that every possible object falls either definitely inside or definitely outside that boundary. But in logic there is no drawing of boundaries. Such sensible theory of indeterminacy, appealing as it is, cannot accommodate a workable metaphysic of the material world. Any attempt to spell out in detail a metaphysic of the material world that incorporates the sensible theory of indeterminacy will demonstrably have consequences less appealing, or more appalling, than a rejection of the sensible theory of indeterminacy.
Mikael STENMARK
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND THE SOME-ARE-EQUALLY-RIGHT VIEW
Abstract. In this essay I identify and develop an alternative to pluralism which is overlooked in contemporary debate in philosophy of religion and in theology. According to this view, some but not all of the great world religions are equally correct, that is to say, they are just as successful when it comes to tracking the truth and providing a path to salvation. This alternative is not haunted by the same difficulty as pluralism, namely the problem of emptiness. It is therefore more rational at least for many Muslims, but probably also for many Christians and Jews, to embrace it rather than to embrace pluralism. Whether it is also to be preferred over exclusivism and inclusivism is a topic which I will not address in this essay.
Michael SUDDUTH
REVISITING THE 'REFORMED OBJECTION' TO NATURAL THEOLOGY
Abstract. In the present paper I address two significant and prevalent errors concerning opposition to natural theology within the Reformed theological tradition. First, contrary to Alvin Plantinga, I argue that the idea of properly basic theistic belief has not motivated or otherwise grounded opposition to natural theology within the Reformed tradition. There is, in fact, a Reformed endorsement of natural theology grounded in the notion that theistic belief can be properly basic. Secondly, I argue that late nineteenth- and twentieth-century Reformed criticisms of natural theology do not constitute an objection to natural theology as such but rather an objection to natural theology construed in a particular way. I explore the nature of this objection and its compatibility with an alternative understanding of natural theology.
Fiona ELLIS
MURDOCH AND LEVINAS ON GOD AND GOOD
Abstract. Murdoch and Levinas both believe that our humanity requires us to suppress our natural egoism and to be morally responsive to others. Murdoch insists that while such a morality presupposes a 'transcendent background', God should be kept out of the picture altogether. By contrast, Levinas argues that, in responding morally to others, we make contact with God (though not the God of traditional Christianity) and that in doing so we become more God-like. I attempt to clarify their agreements and differences, and I offer some criticisms of their conception of humanity, God, and the relationship between them.
Chris DALY
MORAL ERROR THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Abstract. Moral error theory claims that no moral sentence is (non-vacuously) true. Atheism claims that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with, or makes improbable, the existence of God. Is moral error theory compatible with atheism? This paper defends the thesis that it is compatible against criticisms by Nicholas Sturgeon.
Stephen MAITZEN
ORDINARY MORALITY IMPLIES ATHEISM
Abstract. I present a "moral argument" for the non-existence of God. Theism, I argue, can't accommodate an ordinary and fundamental moral obligation acknowledged by many people, including many theists. My argument turns on a principle that a number of philosophers already accept as a constraint on God's treatment of human beings. I defend the principle against objections from those inclined to reject it.
Jerome GELLMAN
JEAN PAUL SARTRE: THE MYSTICAL ATHEIST
Abstract: Within Jean Paul Sartre's atheistic program, he objected to Christian mysticism as a delusory desire for substantive being. I suggest that a Christian mystic might reply to Sartre's attack by claiming that Sartre indeed grasps something right about the human condition but falls short of fully understanding what he grasps. Then I argue that the true basis of Sartre's atheism is neither philosophical nor existentialist, but rather mystical. Sartre had an early mystical atheistic intuition that later developed into atheistic mystical experience. Sartre experienced the non-existence of God.
contents of the previous issues
Volume 1 / Number 1 / Spring 2009:
Jonathan L. KVANVIG
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND THE BURIDAN'S ASS PARADOX
Abstract. The paradox of Buridan's Ass involves an animal facing two equally adequate and attractive alternatives, such as would happen were a hungry ass to confront two bales of hay that are equal in all respects relevant to the ass's hunger. Of course, the ass will eat from one rather than the other, because the alternative is to starve. But why does this eating happen? What reason is operative, and what explanation can be given as to why the ass eats from, say, the left bale rather than the right bale? Why doesn't the ass remain caught between the options, forever indecisive and starving to death? Religious pluralists face a similar dilemma, a dilemma that I will argue is more difficult to address than the paradox just described.
Paul REASONER & Charles TALIAFERRO
THE DOUBLE-MOVEMENT MODEL OF FORGIVENESS IN BUDDHIST AND CHRISTIAN RITUALS
Abstract. We offer a model of moral reform and regeneration that involves a wrong-doer making two movements: on the one hand, he identifies with himself as the one who did the act, while he also intentionally moves away from that self (or set of desires and intentions) and moves toward a transformed identity. We see this model at work in the formal practice of contrition and reform in Christian and Buddhist rites. This paper is part of a broader project we are undertaking on the philosophy of forgiveness.
William E. MANN
THE GUILTY MIND
Abstract. The doctrine of mens rea can be expressed in this way: MRP: If A is culpable for performing ö, then A performs ö intentionally in circumstances in which it is impermissible to perform ö. The Sermon on the Mount suggests the following principle: SMP: If A intends to perform ö in circumstances in which it would be impermissible for A to perform ö, then A's intending to perform ö makes A as culpable as A would be were A to perform ö. MRP and SMP are principles representative of intentionalism, a family of views that emphasizes the importance of intention to judgments about culpability. This essay examines an intentionalist's defense of MRP with respect to lying, strict criminal liability, and the distinction between intention and foreseeability, along with a defense of SMP with respect to failed attempts, and self-defense.
William HASKER
BEAUTY AND METAPHYSICS
Abstract. It is shown through examples ranging from Parmenides and Plato to Whitehead and Wittgenstein that beauty is central among the values that have made metaphysical theories appealing and credible. A common attitude would be that the aesthetic properties of metaphysical theories may be important for effective presentation but are irrelevant to the cognitive value of the theories. This however is question-begging, since it assumes without argument that ultimate reality is indifferent to value-considerations such as beauty. If on the contrary we allow that the aesthetic properties of theories may be cognitively relevant, which such properties should be considered? This question is explored in the final section of the paper.
Paul HELM
ETERNITY AND VISION IN BOETHIUS
Abstract. Boethius and Augustine of Hippo and are two of the fountainheads from which the long tradition of regarding God's existence as timelessly eternal has flowed, a tradition which has influenced not only Christianity, but Judaism and Islam too. But though the two have divine eternality in common, I shall argue that in other respects, in certain crucial respects, they differ significantly over how they articulate that notion.
Balazs MEZEI
TWO MODELS OF RADICAL REVELATION IN AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY
Abstract. In this paper I highlight two opposing models of the notion of divine revelation: the propositional and the radical. The propositional understanding of revelation was central to theology and philosophy until the 19th century. Since then, a number of other models of revelation have emerged. I define as radical the understanding of revelation which emphasizes two features of revelation: 1) God's existence is *per se* revelatory; 2) God's revelation is per se self-revelation. I propose too an assessment of the notion of propositional revelation as presented by Richard Swinburne. And I offer detailed analyses of two representatives of the early understanding of divine revelation as self-revelation: the views of Bernard Bolzano and Anton Günther. Bolzano, the renowned mathematician, was also a philosopher of religion; and Günther, one of the most ingenious writers in Austrian philosophy, was not only a theologian but also a philosopher comparable to the important figures of 19th century German thought.
Thomas SCHÄRTL
THE CHALLENGE OF THEODICY AND THE DIVINE ACCESS TO THE UNIVERSE
Abstract. Any new attempt to cope with the problem of theodicy is forced to reinterpret and remodify the classic set of divine attributes. Classical monotheism, at least in the Christian or Islamic tradition, emphasizes the concept of God as a personal, almighty being who is in a completely free relation to the world. However, even within Christianity we find other tendencies which might help us to rewrite the idea that God has some sort of libertarian and unrestricted access to the world. The following article raises the question whether God, as an absolute being, can influence the course of the world directly. The answer to this question has an enormous impact on the problem of theodicy: If God's non-intervention is based on God's essence (rather than any form of initial self-restriction), then God cannot be held directly responsible for not performing direct acts of intervention.
