Theism and Contrastive Explanation
AbstractI argue that there could not be grounds on which to introduce God into our ontology. My argument presupposes two doctrines. First, we should allow into our ontology only what figures in the best explanation of an event or fact. Second, explanation is contrastive by nature, in that the explanandum always consists in a contrast between a fact and a foil. I argue that God could not figure in true contrastive explanatory statements, because the omnipotence of God guarantees that for any true proposition p, God could have made it the case that ~p just as much as He could have made it the case that p.
How to Cite
Came, Daniel. 2017. “Theism and Contrastive Explanation”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):19-26. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1862.