Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?


  • Justin Mooney University of Massachusetts Amherst



foreknowledge, middle knowledge, molinism, free will


John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly’s recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer’s claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom.


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———. 2015. “Do God's Beliefs about the Future Depend on the Future?”. Journal of Analytic Theology 3: 124–29.

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How to Cite

Mooney, Justin. 2018. “Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2):131-48.



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