Most Peers Don’t Believe It, Hence It Is Probably False


  • René van Woudenberg Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
  • Hans van Eyghen Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam



Lovering, peer disagreement, arguments for God's existence


Rob Lovering has recently argued that since theists have been unable, by means of philosophical arguments, to convince 85 percent of professional philosophers that God exists, at least one of their defining beliefs must be either false or meaningless. This paper is a critical examination of his argument. First we present Lovering’s argument and point out its salient features. Next we explain why the argument’s conclusion is entirely acceptable for theists, even if, as we show, there are multiple problems with the premises.

Author Biographies

René van Woudenberg, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Chair Epistemology and Metaphysics

Dept. of Philosophy

Hans van Eyghen, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Ph.D. Candidate Philosophy


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How to Cite

Woudenberg, René van, and Hans van Eyghen. 2017. “Most Peers Don’t Believe It, Hence It Is Probably False”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):87-112.