Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland's Argument from Consciousness

Authors

  • Daniel Lim University of Cambridge

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.405

Abstract

In his so-called Argument from Consciousness (AC), J.P. moreland argues that the phenomenon of consciousness furnishes us with evidence for the existence of God. In defending AC, however, Moreland makes claims that generate an undesirable tension. This tension can be posed as a dilemma based on the contingency of the correlation between mental and physical states. The correlation of mental and physical states is either contingent or necessary. If the correlation is contingent then epiphenomenalism is true. If the correlation is necessary then a theistic explanation for the correlation is forfeit. Both are unwelcome results for AC. 

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Published

2011-09-23

How to Cite

Lim, Daniel. 2011. “Zombies, Epiphenomenalism and Personal Explanations: A Tension in Moreland’s Argument from Consciousness”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):439-50. https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v3i2.405.

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