https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/issue/feed European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2021-08-01T12:18:52+02:00 Prof. Dr. Georg Gasser deputy.editor@philosophy-of-religion.eu Open Journal Systems <p><em>European Journal for Philosophy of Religion </em>(EJPR) is a peer-reviewed international journal devoted to the problems of the philosophy of religion.</p> https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3398 Cognitive Regeneration and the Noetic Effects of Sin: Why Theology and Cognitive Science May not be Compatible 2021-08-01T12:18:52+02:00 Lari Launonen lari.launonen@gmail.com <p>Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports the existence of a god-faculty akin to sensus divinitatis. They propose that God may have given rise to the god-faculty via guided evolution. This suggestion raises two theological worries. First, our natural cognition seems to favor false god-beliefs over true ones. Second, it also makes us prone to tribalism. If God hates idolatry and moral evil, why would he give rise to mind with such biases? A Plantingian response would point to the noetic effects of sin. Such a response, however, would have to assume that God is restoring the minds of believers. This paper considers empirical reasons to doubt that such a process is taking place.</p> 2021-08-01T00:00:00+02:00 Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3212 Sublating Rationality: The Eucharist as an Existential Trial 2020-11-02T22:08:32+01:00 Liran Shia Gordon lirangordon@gmail.com <p>The Eucharist as a pillar of Christian life and faith stands at the center of the Mass. It carries multi-dimensional meanings and functions, each of which addresses different aspects of the Christian life and mindset. The main question that we will attend to is what happens to the rational framework of the believer or non-believer as s/he affirms or denies that the consecrated bread and wine are Christ’s body and blood. Following Edward Schillebeeckx’s phenomenological approach, it will be argued that such a reformulation of the rational framework accords with Heidegger’s reevaluation of the question of Being. The present reading limits itself to the encounter between the mind and the phenomenon and does not proceed to the meaning of the Eucharist as part of the Mass and the crucifixion of Christ. As such this study is not a historical study nor a sociological or anthropological one.</p> 2021-05-24T00:00:00+02:00 Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3306 Divine Simplicity: The Aspectival Account 2021-06-04T12:00:15+02:00 Joshua Reginald Sijuwade jrs557@york.ac.uk <p>This article aims to provide a consistent explication of the doctrine of Divine Simplicity. To achieve this end, a re-construal of the doctrine is made within an “aspectival trope-theoretic” metaphysical framework, which will ultimately enable the doctrine to be elucidated in a consistent manner, and the Plantingian objections raised against it will be shown to be unproblematic.</p> 2021-06-04T00:00:00+02:00 Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3656 Schellenberg's Noseeum Assumption about Nonresistant Nonbelief 2021-02-20T20:22:08+01:00 Paul Macdonald paul.macdonald.2@usafa.edu <table class="data" width="100%"> <tbody> <tr valign="top"> <td class="value">In this article, I outline a strategy for challenging J.L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument, and specifically the premise within the argument that asserts the existence of what Schellenberg calls nonresistant nonbelief.&nbsp;&nbsp;Drawing on some of the philosophical resources of skeptical theism, I show how this premise is based on a particular “noseeum assumption”—what I call Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption—that underwrites a particular “noseeum argument.” This assumption is that, regarding putative nonresistant nonbelievers,&nbsp;<em>more likely than not we’d detect these nonbelievers’ resistance toward God if there were any</em>.&nbsp;&nbsp;I give reasons for thinking that it is not more reasonable to affirm than to refrain from affirming Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption, and so reason to think that the hiddenness argument is not a good argument for atheism.&nbsp;&nbsp;I also defend the strategy I outline against several objections.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> 2021-03-02T00:00:00+01:00 Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion