European Journal for Philosophy of Religion https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr <p><em>European Journal for Philosophy of Religion </em>(EJPR) is a peer-reviewed international journal devoted to the problems of the philosophy of religion.</p> Verein zur Förderung der Fachzeitschrift European Journal for Philosophy of Religion en-US European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1689-8311 The Why and the How of Renewal in Philosophy of Religion https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3289 <p>Recently, we co-edited a volume of essays (Draper &amp; Schellenberg 2017) dedicated to the proposition that our field, the philosophy of religion, is not all that it could be. The new set of essays we’re joining here shows that this sentiment is, at the least, not going away. That’s encouraging, but how can we get beyond sentiment? In this our own essay we hope to do so by focusing very precisely and persuasively on problems and solutions: on <em>why</em> our field needs renewal and <em>how</em> to achieve it. More specifically, we hope to get every reader to recognize and accept at least one problem from the range of problems in the field as it exists today that we propose to identify, and to select for special thought and supportive effort at least one solution from the range of solutions we’ll be promoting. Let’s adjust that slightly: one <em>extra</em> problem and one <em>extra</em> solution – for we’re going to start by setting the right mood with some thoughts about a very basic problem/solution pair that we should all be able to recognize/support.</p> Paul Draper John L. Schellenberg Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 14 1 1 20 10.24204/ejpr.2022.3289 Rethinking Religious Epistemology https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3290 <p>This article uses recent work in philosophy of science and social epistemology to argue for a shift in analytic philosophy of religion from a knowledge-centric epistemology to an epistemology centered on understanding. Not only can an understanding-centered approach open up new avenues for the exploration of largely neglected aspects of the religious life, it can also shed light on how religious participation might be epistemically valuable in ways that knowledge-centered approaches fail to capture. Further, it can create new opportunities for interaction with neighboring disciplines and can help us revitalize and transform stagnant debates in philosophy of religion, while simultaneously allowing for the introduction and recovery of marginalized voices and traditions.</p> Amber L. Griffioen Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 14 1 21 47 10.24204/ejpr.2022.3290 Queer Advice to Christian Philosophers https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3291 <p>Philosophy of religion is dominated by Christianity and by Christians. This, in conjunction with the historically anti-LGBTQIA bent of Christian thinking, has resulted in the exclusion of less dominant and often marginalized perspectives, including queer ones. This essay charts a normative direction for Christian philosophers and for philosophy of religion, a subfield they dominate. First, given some of the unique ways Christian philosophy and philosophers have unjustly harmed queers, Christian philosophers as a group have a responsibility to communities their group has oppressed to prioritize the interests of the oppressed. Second, Christian philosophers must prioritize queer voices by creating or furthering academic space (e.g., at conferences, in journals and books, and in academic posts) for those who publicly and professionally identify as queer. Third, Christian philosophers must mitigate their criticisms of queers and queerness where such criticisms would undermine their efforts toward compensatory/reparative justice.</p> Blake Hereth Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 14 1 49 75 10.24204/ejpr.2022.3291 The Epistemic Benefits of Diversifying the Philosophy of Religion https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3396 <p>There have been recent calls to expand contemporary analytic philosophy of religion beyond the oft implicitly assumed Christian tradition. Instead of exploring moral reasons to expand the discipline, I argue that there are strong epistemic reasons to favour diversifying the philosophy of religion. Increasing diversity is likely to increase disagreement, and there are epistemic benefits to be gained from the existence of disagreement. I argue that such considerations quite clearly apply to the philosophy of religion, and as such that there are epistemic reasons to diversify the field. I conclude by offering a number of practical steps we can take towards achieving this end which are relatively easy to implement.</p> Kirk Lougheed Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 14 1 77 94 10.24204/ejpr.2022.3396 A Faith for the Future https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3677 <p>Abstract. In the philosophy of J. L. Schellenberg, “evolutionary religion” is a religious stance oriented towards the deep future. According to Schellenberg, the best form of evolutionary religion is non-doxastic faith in ultimism. I reject Schellenberg’s arguments for preferring ultimism and suggest that committing non-doxastically to traditional religion makes more sense from an evolutionary perspective. I argue that the alignment argument for traditional religion remains sound even when the deep future is considered. Furthermore, I assess Schellenberg’s claim that humanity is religiously immature.</p> Carl-Johan Palmqvist Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 14 1 95 122 10.24204/ejpr.2022.3677 An Epistemic Defeater for Islamic Belief? https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3483 <p align="LEFT">Abstract. This article seeks to outline how a Muslim believer can deflect a defeater for Islamic belief put forward by Erik Baldwin and Tyler McNabb. In doing so, it aims to reject the suggestion that an Islamic religious epistemology is somehow antithetical to a model of Reformed epistemology (RE) which is not fully compatible with Plantingian. Taken together with previous work on Islam and RE, the article not only aims to provide reason to think that Baldwin and McNabb’s proposed epistemic defeater for Islamic belief isn’t problematic, it also seeks to show how the concerns raised by Baldwin and McNabb over a Plantingian model of RE in Islamic milieu, are no longer tenable.</p> Jamie Benjamin Turner Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 14 1 123 142 10.24204/ejpr.2022.3483 Divine Simplicity https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3306 <p>This article aims to provide a consistent explication of the doctrine of Divine Simplicity. To achieve this end, a re-construal of the doctrine is made within an “aspectival trope-theoretic” metaphysical framework, which will ultimately enable the doctrine to be elucidated in a consistent manner, and the Plantingian objections raised against it will be shown to be unproblematic.</p> Joshua Reginald Sijuwade Copyright (c) 2021 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2021-06-04 2021-06-04 14 1 143 179 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3306 Belief, Resistance, and Grace: Stump on Divine Hiddenness https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3227 <p>Arguments from divine hiddenness attempt to show that God, as understood by traditional Christianity, does not exist.Eleonore Stump has argued that, contrary to a key premise in such arguments, it is possible for God to have a personal relationship with human beings who do not believe that he exists. I describe Stump’s account of the will and describe its connection to her explanation of divine hiddenness. Specifically, I show that her account of the knowledge of persons cannot solve the problem of divine hiddenness. I also argue that Stump’s account of the will commits her to the claim that lacking belief in God’s existence entails resistance to God’s grace.</p> Katherine E. Sweet Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-03-08 2022-03-08 14 1 181 205 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3227 Liberal Naturalism without Reenchantment https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3350 <p class="western" align="JUSTIFY">There is a close conceptual relation between the notions of religious disenchantment and scientific naturalism. One way of resisting philosophical and cultural implications of the scientific image and the subsequent process of disenchantment can be found in attempts at sketching a reenchanted worldview. The main issue of accounts of reenchantment can be a rejection of scientific results in a way that flies in the face of good reason. Opposed to such reenchantment is scientific naturalism which implies an entirely disenchanted worldview. However, one of the main problems of scientific naturalism are placement problems. A reenchanted worldview does have the conceptual resources to avoid placement problems, yet seems to throw out the baby (a reasonable appeal to science as an authority) with the bathwater (placement problems). A dilemma results: the Scylla of an undesirable scientific naturalism and the Charybdis of a rampant, seemingly prescientific reenchanted worldview. In this article I argue that there is a safe middle passage between these two options, i.e. the recently proposed liberal naturalism which allows for a moderate normative reenchantment. Liberal naturalism lets us have it both ways: avoiding the placement problems while retaining a necessary and reasonable adherence to science, thereby avoiding both an all-too restrictive scientific naturalism.</p> Thomas J. Spiegel Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 14 1 207 229 10.24204/ejpr.2022.3350 Methodological Naturalism and Scientific Success https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3403 <p>Several metaphysical naturalists argue that the success of science, together with the claim that scientists adhere to methodological naturalism, amounts to strong evidence for metaphysical naturalism. I call this the scientific-success argument. It is argued that the scientific-success argument is similar to the no-miracles argument for realism in philosophy of science. On the no-miracles argument, the success of science is taken as strong evidence that scientific theories are (approximately) true. Based on this similarity, some considerations relevant to one argument may also be relevant to the other. One particular consideration is explored. The selectionist response to the no-miracles argument states that on an evolutionary model of science, in which scientific theories are accepted only after surviving a rigorous selection process, the no-miracles argument fails. The selectionist response also applies to the scientific-success argument. If scientific theories are selected for success, we do not need to explain the success of science by appealing to metaphysical naturalism.</p> Yunus Adi Prasetya Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-02-28 2022-02-28 14 1 231 256 10.24204/ejpr.2021.3403 From a Necessary Being to a Perfect Being: A Reply to Byerly https://www.philosophy-of-religion.eu/index.php/ejpr/article/view/3446 <p>Cosmological arguments for God typically have two stages. The first stage argues for a first cause or a necessary being, and the second stage argues from there to God. T. Ryan Byerly offers a simple, abductive argument for the second stage where the best explanation for why the being is found to have necessary existence is that it is a perfect being. The reasoning behind this argument is that universal generalizations explain observations of their instances; for example, the universal generalization that all ravens are black explains why some particular raven is observed to be black. Similarly, the fact that a being has all perfections explains why we find the being to have necessary existence. I distinguish between two readings of Byerly’s proposed theistic explanation, and conclude that his explanation does not offer an advantage to the theist in either case.</p> Tina Anderson Copyright (c) 2022 European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2022-03-31 2022-03-31 14 1 257 268 10.24204/ejpr.2022.3446