Abductive Reasoning and an Omnipotent God: A Response to Daniel Came
Daniel Came (2017) boldly argues that given certain assumptions, no omnipotent being can even in principle be the best explanation for some contingent state of affairs S. In this paper, I argue that (i) even given Came’s assumptions, his argument rests crucially on a non sequitur, that (ii) he just assumes that the prior probability of God’s existence is very low, and that (iii) his conclusions entail propositions that are very probably false.
Came, Daniel. “Theism and Contrastive Explanation.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9, no. 1 (2017): 19–26. doi:10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1862.
Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press, 2004